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MILITARY LAW: COLLATERAL ATTACK OF
COURTS-MARTIAL IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS
THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE provides for a system of
review of decisions of military tribunals, with final appeal to the Court
of Military Appeals.' A necessary corollary to this independent
judicial structure is that determinations of military tribunals are not
directly reviewable by civil courts.' However, judgments of military.
tribunals have been collaterally attacked in civil courts by writ of
habeas corpus' or suit for back pay in the Court of Claims.4 In such
instances, the federal courts, including the Court of Claims, have
considered only the question of jurisdiction of the military court, dis-
claiming any authority to review questions of military law.5
In a recent case, Johnson v. United States,6 the Court of Claim§
departed from this rule of review of military tribunals and refused to
give effect to a rule of military law promulgated by the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals. Johnson had been found guilty of larceny and was
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. io8 (1950), so U.S.C. § 8o (1958)
[hereinafter cited as UCMJ].
'See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953) ; Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (195o) ;
Shaw v. United States, 2o9 F.2d 8i (D.C. Cir. 1954) i EvERErr, MILITARY JUST11CE
IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES 304 (1956) 5 Craig, Double Jeopardy
and Cumulative Sentencing in the Military, 48 GEo. L.J. 43, 46 (1959).
'E.g., Burns v. Wilson, supra note 25 Hiatt v. Brown, supra note 2; In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) i Fischer v. Ruffner, 277 F.zd 756 (5th Cir. 196o).
See EvEPE'rr, op. cit. supra note 2, ch. '8; i MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.5 (2d
ed. 196o). See generally Wurfel, Military Habeas Corpus, 49 MICH. L. REv. (pts.
I & 2) 493, 699 (1951); Annot., t5 A.L.R.2d 387 (1951).
'E.g., Moses v. United States, 137 Ct. Cl. 374 (1957); Graham v. United States,
136 Ct. Cl. 324 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 957 (1957); Lucas v. United States,
121 Ct. Cl. 819 (1952); Fly v. United States, 120 Ct. Cl. 482, 100 F. Supp. 440
(i95i); Shapiro v. United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 650, 69 F. Supp. 205 (1947). See
also McLean v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 775 (W.D.S.C. 1947) (district courts
have concurrent jurisdiction).
'See, e.g., Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (195o); Fischer v. Ruffner, 277 F.2d
756 (5th Cir. 196o); Dickenson v. Davis, 245 F.2d 317 (ioth Cir. 1957); Easley
v. Hunter, 2o9 F.zd 483 (ioth Cir. 1953) i Griffiths v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 69 i
(Ct. C.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 865 (1959) i Graham v. United States, supra note
4; Sima v. United States, 119 Ct. Cl. 405, 96 F. Supp. 932 (1951). But see Jackson
v. McElroy, 163 F. Supp. 257 (D.D.C. 1958) (decisions of Court of Military Appeals
not binding on federal district courts, but persuasive).
0 28o F.2d 856 (Ct. Cl. 196o).
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sentenced to six months hard labor with partial forfeiture of pay and a
bad conduct discharge 1 Following the sentence, he was reduced in
rank from sergeant to airman basic under a provision' in the Manual for
Courts-Martial' which provides that non-commissioned officers sen-
tenced to confinement shall be reduced to the lowest enlisted grade
Many common law crimes are recognized as offenses triable by courts-martial.
UCMJ arts. 77-134, 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934 (1958) (the punitive articles). Congress
has given the President power to prescribe maximum sentences. UCMJ art. 56, xo
U.S.C. § 856 (1958). The maximum limits of punishment are set out in U.S. DEP'T
OF' DEFENSE MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES 127 (1951) [herein-
after cited as MCM].
8 'The Air Force policy of "automatic-reduction" as a consequence of conviction
for offenses which carry a sentence of confinement was based upon MCM I iz6e as
amended by Executive Order io652, January io, 1956, 21 Fed. Reg. 235. "[A]
sentence which . . . includes (I) dishonorable or bad conduct discharge . . . , (2) con-
fihement, or (3) hard labor without confinement, immediately upon being finally
approved . . . shall reduce . . . [an] enlisted person to the lowest enlisted pay
grade . .. .
Following the Simpson case, the Air Force announced a new policy:
"'The effect of this decision is that unless a reduction to the lowest enlisted grade
ij, to an intermediate grade is included in the court-martial sentence, accused will be
retained in his present grade and pay status even though he .may be in confinement, or
'performing hard labor without confinement, or awaiting punitive discharge." Letter
from the Staff Judge Advocate, (ARTJA) (x959).
On July 12, 196o, Congress enacted UCMJ art. 58a, ch. 633, 74 Stat. 468 which
legislatively overruled the Simpson case and reinstated the practice of automatic re-
auction:
"(a) Unless otherwise provided in regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary
concerned, a court-martial sentence of an enlisted. member in .a. pay grade above E-t,
a approved by the convening authority, that includes-.-
, (i) ,A dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge;.
.(2) -confinement; or
(3) hard labor-without confinement;
reduces that member to pay grade E-i, effective on the date of that alpproval."
The portion of MCM I 1z6e which permits a court-martial to order a reduction in
pay grade as an integral part of the sentence remains unquestioned and unimpaired
in effect.
.. 9 Under UCMJ art. 36, 1o U.S.C. § 836 (1958), the President is given authority
to prescribe regulations for the conduct, of courts-martial not inconsistent with thp
Code. By Executive Order 10214 of February 8, i95i, the Pyesident ordered publica-
tion of the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL. In United States v. Brasher, 2 U.S.C.M.A.
5o, 52, 6 C.M.R. 5o, 5z (19i2), the Court of Military.Appeals stated that "the Act of
Congress ... and the act of the Executive-... function at the same authoritative level."
,it-United States v. Clark, i U.SIC.M.A.,zo, 204, 2 C.M.R. 107, 1 10 (1952), the
,i2urt of Military Appeals exercise& power to construe a provision of the Manual and
b~d tha -if a. pxovision, of the Manual should conflict with the Code the latter would
control. In United States v. Wappler, a U.S.C.M.A.. 39 3, 9 C.M.R. 23 6953), the
court first held invalid a provision of MCM as in,oofltcq with the T.JCMJ (bread
and water as punishment).
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immediately upon, approval of sentence."0  The Court of Military
Appeals denied review." However, in United States v. Simpson,
decided shortly after Johnson's appeal was denied, the court held the
automatic-reduction provision invalid.13
Relying on the Simpson case, Johnson brought suit in the Court
of Claims,' 4 demanding reimbursement for the loss in pay suffered as
10The commanding officer who convened the court-martial approved the bad
conduct discharge. See UCMJ art. 64, 1o U.S.C. § 864- (i958) (approval of sen-
tence). Johnson was then reduced to the lowest enlisted grade. Later the bad
conduct discharge was remitted and he was retained in the Air Force. Johnson v.
United States, 28o F.2d 856 (Ct. C1. xg6o).
Designation of persons with authority to convene a general court-martial is found
in UCMJ art. 72, xo U.S.C. § zz (1958). The commanding officer of a separate
wing of the Air Force is one such person.
11A.C.M. 13535, Johnson, review deinied sub nom. United States v. Johnson, 8
U.S.C.M.A. 773 0x957) (mem.).
12, o U.S.C.M.A. 229, 27 C.M.R. 303 (x959). The Simpson case is noted in 35
NOTRE DAME LAW. 159 (1959), but the "automatic-reduction" point is not discussed.
Simpson, an Air Force sergeant, was convicted of larceny by check and sentenced
to a bad conduct discharge. The convening authority approved the sentence but
suspended execution of discharge. The accused was reduced to airman first class by
ihe c6nvefiing authority, unless the suspension of the discharge was vacated, in which
event the accused would be reduced to the lowest enlisted grade. United States v.
Simpson, supra at 231, 27 C.M.R. at 305. Cf. United States v. Varnadore, 9 U.S.C.M.A.
471, 26 C.M.R. 251 (1958) (long term confinement without punitive discharge);
United States v. Choate, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 68o, 26 C.M.R. 46o (.958) (Navy policy).
"The court, in setting aside the.reduction. in grade, stated that the provision was an
integral part of the sentencing process. It held that the power to impose a reduction
in this manner is essentially judicial. in its nature and, as such, may be imposed only
by a court-martial. Once sentence is pronounced by a, court-martial any subsequent
"automatic-reduction" bya 'reviewing authority is invalid, for it operates improperly
to increase the severity of the sentence by a non-judicial act. io U.S.C.M.A. at 232, 27
C.M.R. at 3o6. dccord, United States v. Hare, io U.S.C.M.A. 309, 27 C.M.R. 383
(1959); United States v. Chatman, 1o U.S.C.M.A. z62, 27 C.M.R. 336 (i959);
United States v. Littlepage, io U.S.C.M.A. 245, 27 C.M.R. 39 (1959); United States
v. Lane, io U.S.C.M.A. 741, 27 C.M.R. 315 (1959). See UCMJ arts. 62, 67, 10
U.S.C. §§ 86z, 867 (1958). Cf. United States v. Castner, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 466, 13C.M.R. -22 (1953).
In-United States v. Armbruster, ii U.S.C.M.A. 596, 29 C.M.R. 41z (i96o) the
Court of Military Appeals, all judges concurring, reaffirmed 'that "automatic-reduc-
tion" was invalid under the UCMJ. The Armbruster decision was rendered while the
Johitron case was pending before-the Court of Claims.
Of course, the substantive rule announced is no longer law since the enactment 0f
UCMJ art. 58a, ch. 633, 74 Stat. 468 (i96o). See note 8 supra.
"The authority of the Court of Claims to entertain suits for back pay is based on
ifs jurisdiction to try claims against the United States -based upon an act 6f, Congress
or regulation of an executive department, claims -for damages not sounding in tort,
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a result of his reduction in rank. The Court of Claims declined to
follow the ruling of the Court of Military Appeals in Simpson and
dismissed the claim, holding that the "automatic-reduction" provision
was administrative rather than judicial, hence a valid exercise of
presidential power as Commander-in-Chief. 5 The court stated that
adoption of plaintiff's view would "tread heavily on long established
patterns of procedure within the military." Furthermore, the court
professed that judicial restraint required non-intervention, since Con-
gress had not made the Court of Claims an "overseer of the military.""
On its face, the opinion adopts a "hands-off" attitude toward making
decisions in the field of military law. Notwithstanding its announced
intention, the Court of Claims considered and refused to enforce a
rule of military law enunciated by the highest court of the military."
and claims for damages by any person unjustly convicted of an offense against the
United States and imprisoned. z8 U.S.C. §§ 1491, 1495, 2513 (1958).
A suit based on unjust conviction involves showing a right to recover by means
of a certificate of innocence or a pardon, not present here. See Roberson v. United
States, 129 Ct. CL. 581 (1954).
UCMJ art. 75, 10 U.S.C. § 875 (1958) provides for restoration of rights and
property affected by an executed sentence which has been set aside or disapproved by
higher military authority. No provision is made to allow a person such as Johnson
(whose court-martial the Court of Military Appeals declined to review) to take ad-
vantage of subsequent favorable decisions.
A person who is reduced automatically under the new Code provision is entitled to
restoration of rights and privileges if the sentence as finally approved does not include
any punishment giving rise to the reduction. UCMJ art. 58a (b), ch. 633, 74 Stat.
468" (196o).
A person convicted by court-martial has an administrative remedy independent of
the direct review provided in UCMJ. Congress requires each military department to
maintain a board for correction of military records. io U.S.C. § 1552 (1958). An
adverse decision may be reviewed by the Court of Claims. Friedman v. United States,
158 F. Supp. 364 (Ct. Cl. 1958). Cf. Cross v. United States, 135 Ct. CL. 19
(x956) ; Boruski v. United States, 155 F. Supp. 320 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
" U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
"See Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953) (the military is a specialized con-
munity governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian).
"
7 In United States v. Armbruster, ix U.S.C.M.A. 596, 598, 29 C.M.R. 412, 414
(i96o), the Court of Military Appeals asserted that Congress had made it the "supreme
court of the military justice system." Accord, Shaw v. United States, 209 F.zd 811
(D.C. Cir. 1954).
The statutory jurisdiction of the Court of Military Appeals is found in 1o U.S.C.
§ 867 (1958).
Congress has indicated the weight to be given decisions of the Court of Military
Appeals in UCMJ art. 76, 1o U.S.C. § 876 (1958). "The appellate review of records
of trial provided by this [Code is] binding on all departments, courts, agencies, and
officers of the United States ... final and conclusive."
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In so doing it stepped beyond the established limits of civil-court
review of determinations of military tribunals.' 8
The federal courts consistently have held that they have no power
to inquire into ordinary questions of fact and law previously determined
by courts-martial. 9 They have only the power to review the jurisdic-
tion of military tribunals20 and to consider alleged infringement of
constitutional rights.2 ' In the past, the Court of Claims has confined
See generally EVERETr, op. cit. supra note 2, ch. 17 ; Walker & Niebank, The
Court of Military Appeals-Its History, Organization, and Operation, 6 VAND. L. REV.
228 (is3) 5 Waltz, Court of Military Appeals: .4n Experiment in Judicial Revolution,
45 A.B.A.J. 1185 (1959)-
" See cases cited at notes 3 and 4 supra. While these cases are distinguishable
from the instant decision in that they concern a denial of constitutional guarantees by
a military tribunal, they demonstrate unmistakably the reluctance of the civil judiciary
to consider questions of substantive military law.
In a leading case, Ex parte Reed, 1oo U.S. 13 (1879), the Supreme Court stated
that the sole question for consideration in a petition for habeas corpus was whether
the military tribunal had jurisdiction. This has been the consistent position of the
Supreme Court and remains the general rule. E.g., Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 1o3
(195o). Recent years have witnessed an increasing tendency on the part of the
federal courts to broaden the scope of their review to encompass claims of denial of
constitutional guarantees. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, rehearing denied, 346
U.S. 844 (1953) (separate opinion by Frankfurter, J.).
Two recent restrictive developments in the jurisdiction of military tribunals may
be compared. In Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) the Supreme Court held
improper an attempt to try a civilian by court-martial for an offense allegedly
committed while in uniform. In Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. i (1957), the Supreme
Court invalidated military jurisdiction over civilian dependents accompanyng service-
men abroad. See generally, Everett, Military Jurisdiction Over Civilians, 1960 DUKE
L.J. 366.
" See, e.g., Fischer v. Ruffner, 277 F.2d 756 ( 5 th Cir. 196o ) 5 Dickenson v. Davis,
245 F.2d 317 (oth Cir. 1957); Easley v. Hunter, 209 F.2d 483 (ioth Cir. 1953);
Richards v. Cox, 184 F. Supp. 107 (D. Kan. 196o ) ; Alley v. Chief, Finance Center,
167 F. Supp. 303 (S.D. Ind. 1958) Jackson v. Sanford, 79 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Ga.
1947).
"See Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (i95o); McClellan v. Humphrey, 181 F.2d
757 ( 3 d Cir. 1950). If the court-martial were legally constituted, had jurisdiction
over the person and over the offense, and if the sentence imposed were within the
maximum authorized by the President, the petition should be dismissed. Wurfel, supra
note 3, at 713.
21 See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (i953) Suttles v. Davis, 2x 5 F.2d 760 (oth
Cir. 1954). In Burns, two airmen convicted by a court-martial contended that they
had been denied due process and that military review was inadequate to resolve their
claims. The Supreme Court held that where the military tribunal had dealt "fully and
fairly" with the allegations, the petition should be dismissed; indicating, moreover,
that a federal court ought not to issue habeas corpus merely to review the evidence.
The Court pointed out, however, that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear such
applications, for the guarantee of due process is adapted to protect soldiers from in-
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itself broadly to this standard.22 Even where the court-martial involved
a denial of due process, the Court of Claims rationalized in terms of
"jurisdiction" its decision in favor of the daimant.25
The brief opinion of the Court of Claims in Johnson makes no
attempt to reconcile that decision with the Simpson case. However,
in holding that the automatic-reduction provision is administrative
rather than judicial, the court seems to imply that the Court of Military
Appeals did not have "jurisdiction" to invalidate this practice.2 4  Ad-
justice, notwithstanding the fact that Congress has provided that courts-martial deter-
'minations are "final" and "binding" upon all courts. See generally, Craig, sutra note
z;. Wurfel, "Military Due Process": What is It, 6 VAND. L. REV. 751 (1953) ; Com-
ment, Strict Construction by U.S. Supreme Court of Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial, 1o
SYRACUSE L. REV. 365 (.959).
2' See cases cited at note 4 supra.
'Shapiro v. United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 65o, 69 F. Supp. 205 0947). The Court
of Claims went further than the jurisdictional test and paralleled the development of
the Burns v. Wilson test. See note zo supra. In Shapiro, the court inquired whether
due process had been afforded when an army officer was given less than two hours
notice of his trial, was denied a continuance, and was not represented by counsel. In
allowing recovery, the Court of Claims held the decision "void" with respect to
claimant's right to compensation for lost pay and allowances, on the ground that the
court-martial by its manifestly unfair action had "lost jurisdiction to continue."
Compare Krivoski v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 954, 145 F. Supp. 239, cert. denied,
352 U.S. 954 (1956). See also Note, Collateral Attack on Courts-Martial in the
Federal Courts, 57 YALE L.J. 483 (1948).
" In the Johnson opinion, the Court of Claims does not make clear the argument
advanced by the Government. However, the Government's position was probably
-built on the following points:
(i) The question of validity of the automatic reduction provision is an admin-
istrative issue, since such a reduction is an administrative action. See separate opinion
of Latimer, J., in United States v. Simpson, io U.S.C.M.A. at 233, 27 C.M.R. at 307
(1959). The Comptroller General, in a letter of reply to this question when posed by
the Secretary of Defense, said: "We believe that the automatic reduction provision of
paragraph 1z6e is administrative rather than judicial in character .. . ." Comptroller
:General's Decision, No. 139988, August i9, 1959, p. 2. However, the Court of
Military Appeals in Simpson expressly held that reduction in grade following court-
martial is judicial, not administrative. See note 13 supra.
(2) The Court of Military Appeals is a court of limited jurisdiction and "hal
take action only with respect to matters of law." io U.S.C. § 867(d) (1958).
(3) Since the issue is administrative, and not a question of law, the Court of
Military Appeals had no jurisdiction to decide the question; thus, the Court of
Claims is -not bound by the decision in Simpson. In United States v. Armbruster, the
'Court of Military Appeals recognizes that the Government was advancing this argu-
ment. ii U.S.C.M.A. 596, 598, 29 C.M.R. 412, 414 (I96O).
This line of reasoning suggests the question: "Does the Court of Military Appeals
.have power to determine its own jurisdiction?" The court would answer affirma-
tively. See note 9 supra. See also Brosman, The Court: Freer Than Most, 6 VAND.
[Vol. i96t: 30t
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mittedly, the. court's decision in Simpson is of questionable merit*
strong policy considerations support the automatic-reduction practice2r'
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the Court of Claims in Johnson; by
refusing to adopt the ruling of the Court of Military Appeals, failed :tb
exercise the judicial restraint it professed to be employing.2" The ve'r
L. REV. 166 (1953) (author was a Judge of the Court of Military Appeals, 95.1-
1955).
"The practice of "automatic-reduction" has been in effect for half a century,
and is said to be an important morale factor in that confinement of NCO's would have
a deleterious effect upon the prestige of and respect shown to the non-commissioned
ranks. Also, it is argued, the presidential power to ensure good order and disciplifie
in the armed services encompasses discretion to command such a reduction. Sie
Johnson v. United States, 28o F.zd 856, 858 (Ct. Cl. 196o) ; United States v. Simpson,
1o U.S.C.M.A. 229, 233, 27 C.M.R. 303, 307 (1959) (separate opinion of Latimef,
J.) 5 Comptroller General's Decision No. 139988, August i9, 19595 H.R. REP. No. 1619,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (196o) (letter from Joseph V. Charyk, Acting Secretary of the
Air Force) 5 Hearing on H.R. 122oo Before the Committee on Armed Services, Uniied
States Senate, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, 29 (196o); Fratcher, Presidential Power tb
Regulate Military Justice: A Critical Study of Decisions of the Court of Military
Appeals, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 861, 883-88 (1959).
"
5 Rather than the frontal attack upon and rejection of the Simpson decision, the
Court of Claims might more easily have posited its decision on the ground that, while
the Simpson rule is valid, it has prospective effect only. See H.R. RE'. No. 1619,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (196o). The Judge Advocate General of the Army adopted
this view: "In view of the [Simpson] decision, subpar 3 ob, AR 624-zoo is rescinded
effective 2o February 1959 and reduction of enlisted members purportedly accomplished
pursuant to par ,z6e, MCM, 195i, on or after that date are invalid and records will be
changed accordingly. However, the decision mentioned does not have retroactive effect,
and, accordingly, reductions effected pursuant to par iz6e, in cases in which appellate
review was completed prior to February 2o, 1959 are valid." JAGA 1959/22583
March 5, x959, 9 Dig. Ops. No. 2, Sentence and Punishment § 33.1.
As introduced, H.R. 22oo would have provided pay in their higher grades for
persons falling under the Simpson decision, from Feb. 2o, 1959, to date of enactment.
However, this section was not enacted. H.R. REP. No. 16i9, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(196o). The Senate Committee on Armed Forces failed to report the remedial portion
of the bill. S. RE'. No. 1737, 86th Cong., zd Sess. 2 (196o). Apparently Chairman
Russell was concerned that such a provision would enable Johnson to win his suit in
the Court of Claims. Johnson's claim was for pay for the whole period from his
reduction in 1952. Hearing on H.R. 122oo Before the Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, 31 (i96o).
The Air Force, by administrative action, adjusted the pay grade to equal their
higher rank for persons who retained their stripes under the Simpson decision, but had
not been paid in that grade in accordance with Comptroller General's Decision No.
13988, August i9 1959. This directive did not apply to airmen reduced under
UCMJ art. 58a, ch. 633, 74 Stat. 468 (196o), see notes 8 and 14 supra, nor to airmen,
discharged punitively or held in confinement as of the operative date, Dec. 16, 196o.
Letter, Clarifying the Status of Personnel Affected by the Simpson Decision, Head-
quarters USAF (AFPDP), Nov. 14, 196o.
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existence of a separate system of military law and procedure recognizes
that the problems and needs of military life are vastly different from
those of the civilian sphere2 7  In addition, recent changes in the scope
and direction of military law28 accentuate the need for certainty in this
specialized branch of the law. This need can be effectively satisfied only
if other courts recognize and give effect to pronouncements by the Court
of Military Appeals on questions of military law.2"
27 See notes 16 and 25 supra.
25 See Fratcher, Presidential Power to Regulate Military Justice: A Critical Study
of Decisions of the Court of Military Appealsi 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 86x (1959); Morgan,
•The Background of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6 VAND. L. REv. 169 (1953).
-Perhaps the emphasis placed on vindication of the rights of the accused is an over-
correction of the abuse of command'control over military justice in the (lays during
and prior to World War I.
." The civil courts should adopt the decisions of the Court of Military Appeals
subject only to the test of "jurisdiction" which comprehends matters related to the
authority of a court-martial to act (note 19 supra) and the test of "due process" (notes
2o and 2z supra). Undoubtedly, decisions of the Court of Military Appeals are
subject to review by the Supreme Court on constitutional issues. The Court of Military
Appeals recognizes this limitation on its authority. United States v. Armbruster, i i
U.S.C.M.A. 596, 598, 29 C.M.R. 412, 414 (196o). But see Everett, op. cit. supra
.note- 2.
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